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ABSTRACT 
This paper extends the neoclassical growth model with productive public capital by 
including an infrastructure efficiency index, which is assumed to depend on a public 
choice variable, in particular, the share of public spending allocated to productive public 
consumption. A golden rule for the allocation of public expenditure between productive 
consumption and investment is specified. Under this framework, the observed path for 
the stock of infrastructures and the proposed efficiency index in the US economy during 
the last fifty years have been close to optimal: a lower stock of infrastructures has been 
accumulated, but it has been used more efficiently. 
 
 
 
 
 
RESUMEN 
Este artículo extiende el modelo neoclásico de crecimiento con capital público 
productivo mediante la incorporación de un índice de eficiencia de las infraestructuras. 
Este índice se supone dependiente de una variable de elección del gobierno, en 
concreto, el porcentaje del gasto público destinado a consumo público productivo. Se 
propone una regla de oro para la distribución del gasto público entre consumo 
productivo e inversión. Bajo este contexto, las sendas temporales observadas en los 
últimos cincuenta años en la economía estadounidense para el stock de infraestructuras 
y el índice de eficiencia propuesto han sido cercanas a las sendas óptimas:se ha 
acumulado un menor stock de infraestructuras, pero también se ha utilizado de forma 
más eficiente. 
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1 Introduction
Literature that focuses on the macroeconomic effects of public expenditure has attached a
productive character to the public investment1 component, because it accumulates public
capital, which is supposed to increase the productivity of private production inputs. From
a theoretical perspective, relevant papers in the area are, among others, Barro (1990), Fu-
tagami et al (1993), Turnovsky and Fischer (1995), Corsetti and Roubini (1996), Glomm
and Ravikumar (1997), Turnovsky (1996), Cassou and Lansing (1998), Lansing (1998)
or Judd (1999). From an empirical perspective, Aschauer (1989), Holt-Eakin (1988),
Munnell (1992), Ford and Poret (1991) or Garc´ia-Mila´ and McGuire (1992)2.
However, a few authors have stressed the decisive role played on long-run economic
growth, not only by the stock of public capital but also by the efficiency with which public
capital3 is used. Hulten (1996) and Aschauer (2000) are central papers in this research
area. Both authors study the convergence experiences for a sample of low and middle
income countries. They extend the Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) model by introducing
an explicit infrastructure effectiveness variable. That is, the decisive variable in their
convergence equation is not the ’nominal’ infrastructure stock but the intrastructure stock
measured in ’efficient units’, which is defined as the product of the nominal stock and
an efficiency index4. They build the efficiency index from a set of physical indicators
(mainline faults per 100 telephone calls, electricity generation losses as a percent of total
system output, the percentage of paved roads in good condition, or diesel locomotive
availability as percent of the total).
Hulten (1996) and Aschauer (2000) show that a large part of the differential growth
rate between countries can be attributed to the difference in the effective use of infras-
tructure resources.
On the other hand, Devarajan et al (1996) study the effects on economic growth of
the composition of public expenditure, which is measured through the split of govern-
ment expenditures between public consumption5 and investment. They examine a panel
of developing countries and conclude that the effects on growth of both components of
public expenditure (consumption and investment) depend not only on their physical pro-
ductivity (i.e., the output elasticity of each component, in a Cobb-Douglas technology),
but also on their initial share on total public spending. They find a positive relation-
ship between GDP growth and the ratio of consumption to total expenditure, while the
investment component is, at the margin, negatively related to GDP growth. They ex-
plain this result as an evidence of an excesive investment share in these countries. The
authors claim: ”The widespread recommendation to increase public investment’s share of
1
Using the IMF’s definition, public investment covers payments for the production of new durable
goods, ie, goods with a life of more than one year, also named public capital, or the purchase of existing
ones.
2
See Munnell (1992), Gramlich (1994), Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) or Pe´rez (2001) for a survey.
3
We will use the term ’public capital’ and ’infrastructures’ indistinctly.
4
This type of transformation is usual in growth literature.
5
Public consumption includes expenditures such as wages and salaries of public employees or payments
for the purchase of non-durable goods. It includes expenditures on: i) economic services (transport, com-
munication, electricity, agriculture, etc); ii) social services (education, health, etc); iii) general government
services (general public administration, defense, public order and safety, etc.).
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the budget in developing countries could be misleading. Several components of current
expenditure, such as operations and maintenance, may have higher rates of return than
capital expenditure.” (Devarajan et al (1996), page 338).
This paper links the works of Hulten (1996) and Aschauer (2000), on the one hand,
and Devarajan et al. (1996) on the other, by analyzing: i) the role played in the aggregate
production process by the efficiency with which infrastructures are used; ii) the role played
in the efficient use of infrastructures by the public consumption expenditure allocated
to the operation and maintenance of the infrastructure stock. The reason to consider
’productive’ this type of public consumption is that it seems sensible to assume that the
services offered by infrastructures to the private inputs is the result of a productive process
in which some components of public investment and consumption take part together. For
instance, a hospital or a school could not be productive without expenditures on doctors’
or teachers’ wages. The same way, a highway could become useless without expenditures
that keep it in good conditions of use. The part of public consumption allocated to the
operations and maintenance of existing infrastructures will be named ’productive public
consumption’.
In our model, productive public consumption could substitute for public capital accu-
mulation: the reallocation of public expenditure towards productive consumption leads
to a lower infrastructure accumulation, but also to a more efficient use of it, beeing even-
tually able to increase the available level of infrastructure in efficiency units (or effective
infrastructure).
The aim of this paper is to obtain the optimal allocation of public exhaustive spend-
ing (the portion of public expenditure included in GDP, that is, public consumption plus
public investment) between investment, i.e., expenditures that accumulate physical infras-
tructures, and productive consumption, i.e., expenditures for operation and maintenance
of infrastructures. From now on, the term public spending when used in the paper will
make reference to exhaustive public spending, that is, excluding transfers.
Our paper differs from this previous literature in two fundamental issues:
i) With respect to Devarajan et al (1996), we specify a technology of production for
effective infrastructure, where an efficiency index is included.
ii) Hulten (1996) and Aschauer (2000) construct an infrastructure efficiency index by
aggregating physical indicators of public capital performance. Hence, their efficiency index
is exogenous to public policy. On the contrary, the efficiency index in our paper depends
on a public choice variable, the part of public consumption allocated to the operations and
maintenance of existing infrastructures (i.e., productive public consumption), in relative
terms to total public investment.
The normative results of the model are related to the north-american recent history
(1952 to 2001), see figure 1. On the one hand, the observed ratio of nominal infrastructure
over private capital has decreased uninterruptedly since the last sixties, and, many authors
claimed that the observed decline contributed significantly to the slowdown in US labor
productivity growth during the seventies and eighties. On the other hand, the realized
path for the infrastructure efficiency index defined in the paper, which is an increasing
function of the share of public spending allocated to productive consumption, increased
significantly after 1968, as a consequence of the reallocation of public spending in favor of
productive consumption. Under the normative results of the model we could conclude that
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the more efficient use of infrastructures after 1968 has partly compensated the decline in
the stock of nominal infrastructures. As a consequence, the observed decline in the ratio
of nominal infrastructures over private capital for the US economy would not explain, by
itself, the productivity slowdown process. Using a very different framework, Cassou and
Lansing (1998) also conclude that the decline in that ratio explains only a minor part of
the productivity slowdown.
[INSERT FIGURE 1]
In fact, we show that the observed evolution in figure 1 for the US economy is consistent
with the normative results of the model. The increasing path observed in the efficiency
index, together with the declining ratio of nominal infrastructures to private capital, is
compatible with the transition towards an optimal allocation of government spending
between investment and productive consumption.
The main contributions of the paper are:
i) Extending the neoclassical growth model with productive public capital by including
an infrastructure efficiency index, which is assumed to depend on a public choice variable,
in particular, the share of public spending allocated to productive public consumption.
ii) Specifying a golden rule for the allocation of public expenditure between productive
consumption and investment.
iii) To show that, under this framework, the observed path for the stock of infrastruc-
tures and the efficiency index in the US economy during the last fifty years have been
close to optimal.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 discusses the calibration of model parameters.
Section 4 computes the competitive equilibrium, and defines the static golden rule for the
public spending composition. Section 5 analyzes the model transition after a permanent
reallocation of government spending. Section 6 defines the golden rule for the composition
of government expenditures taking into account the transitional dynamics of the model (we
will refer to this as ’dynamic golden rule’), and compare it to the US ratio of infrastructures
to private capital. Conclusions are included in section 7.
2 Model
A version of the neoclassical growth model is used, where productive public capital is
included. The economy consists in a government, a representative firm and a represen-
tative household. The only produced good can be used as a consumption good or as an
investment good.
Firms and households act competitively. Government behaviour is summarized by
three ratios: i) percentage of public expenditure allocated to productive consumption; ii)
percentage of public expenditure on output; iii) tax rate on total income.
2.1 Households
Households make consumption-investment decisions so as to maximize their lifetime util-
ity. The standard isoelastic form for the single period utility function is used. Leisure is
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not included in the utility function6, implying an inelastic household’s labor supply which
is normalized to unity.
The agent finances his/her consumption (c
t
) and investment (i
t
) with the labor and
capital incomes received from the firm as a payment for his/her labor supply (n
t
) and
the renting of his/her capital stock (k
t−1
). The government establishes a uniform and
constant tax rate (τ ) on both types of income, as well as a certain amount of lump sum
transfers (TR
t
).
The optimization problem is, therefore:
Max
{c
t
,n
t
,k
t
}
∞
t=0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
c1−σ
t
− 1
1− σ
)
(1)
s.t. :
c
t
+ i
t
≤ (1− τ ) [w
t
n
t
+ r
t
k
t−1
] + TR
t
, (2)
i
t
= k
t
− (1− δ
k
)k
t−1
, (3)
k
0
given ,
where w
t
is the wage, r
t
is the return on capital renting, δ
k
∈ (0, 1) is the private capital
depreciation rate, β ∈ (0, 1) is the rate of time preference, and 1/σ is the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. Equation (3) is the law of motion for private capital, which is
predetermined in period t to the value reached by the end of period t− 1.
Household takes taxes, transfers, wages and interest rate as given, because all of them
are determined out of his/her control7. Households are the owner of firms, but dividends
are not included in the individual budget constraint because firms’ profits are zero in
equilibrium.
2.2 Government
The public sector raises taxes on households’ labor and capital incomes, and uses the
revenues to finance public expenditures, which are determined as a constant percentage
of aggregate output.
Tax revenues and public expenditures are given by (in aggregate per capita terms):
T
t
= τ (w
t
N
t
+ r
t
K
t−1
) ; τ ∈ (0, 1) (4)
G
t
= γ Y
t
; γ ∈ (0, 1) (5)
where T
t
and G
t
are, respectively, tax revenues and public spending; Y
t
is aggregate
output; w
t
N
t
and r
t
K
t−1
are labor and capital incomes; τ is the tax rate on income and
γ is the ratio of public expenditure to output.
6
The aim is to isolate, in the policy experiments, the welfare gains due to increments in private
consumption.
7
The competitive household is negligible with respect to the economy size, and hence, is not able to
alter the equilibrium wage or interest rate levels; on the other hand, the tax rate and transfers are chosen
by the government.
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Transfers are determined to guarantee that the budget balances in every period:
TR
t
= T
t
−G
t
. (6)
Public expenditures are allocated to: i) expenditures for accumulation of physical
infrastructure (investment, Ig
t
), ii) consumption expenditures for operation and mainte-
nance of physical infrastructure (productive consumption, Cg
t
). In per capita aggregate
terms:
Cg
t
= Φ
t
G
t
= Φ
t
γ Y
t
; Φ
t
∈ (0, 1) (7)
Ig
t
= (1−Φ
t
) G
t
= (1−Φ
t
) γ Y
t
, (8)
where Φ
t
is the portion of public spending allocated to productive consumption; from now
on, we will refer to variable Φ
t
as public expenditure composition. Such composition is
time-varying, as the t−index denotes. Both types of public spending have a productive
nature.
The law of motion for the nominal infrastructure stock, in per capita aggregate terms,
is:
Kg
t
= (1− δ
g
) Kg
t−1
+ Ig
t
, (9)
where δ
g
∈ (0, 1) is the infrastructure depreciation rate and Kg
t−1
is the nominal infras-
tructure stock accumulated by the end of period t− 1.
2.3 Firms
The single firm in the economy uses three types of productive inputs: i) private capital
stock, rented to households at a unit cost of r
t
, ii) labor, obtained from households at a
wage w
t
, and iii) infrastructure stock in efficiency units, obtained from the government
without any direct remuneration.
The productive role of infrastructures, from a theoretical and an empirical perspective,
has been extensively analyzed. For example, from a theoretical point of view, Barro
(1990), Futagami et al (1993), Baxter and King (1993), Ambler and Paquet (1996), Cassou
and Lansing (1998), or Lansing (1998).
However, several empirical papers have also presented evidence of the important role
played by the efficiency with which nominal infrastructures are used (see Hulten (1996)
and Aschauer (2000)). This paper proposes a theoretical framework which is consistent
with this empirical evidence.
The firm maximizes profits every period:
Max
{N
t
,K
t−1
}
Y
t
− w
t
N
t
− r
t
K
t−1
(10)
s.t. : Y
t
= N 1−α
t
Kα
t−1
E
α
g
t
, (11)
where Y
t
is aggregate output, N
t
and K
t−1
are the firms’ labor and capital demands,
for which they pay a wage (w
t
) and a rental rate (r
t
), and E
t
is the available effective
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infrastructure level in period t. The production technology is assumed to be of Cobb-
Douglas8 type, with constant returns on private factors (because no direct remuneration
for public productive activity is assumed, so that labor and capital rents exhaust all
national income).
On the other hand, decreasing returns on capital stocks are assumed:
α + α
g
< 1
which exclude the possibility of endogenous growth. Calibration supports this assumption
which is not crucial as long as the analysis is focused in the study of ratios.
Next a functional form for the effective infrastructure level is proposed, according to
the following points.
First, like Hulten (1996) or Aschauer (2000), effective infrastructures are obtained by
multiplying nominal infrastructures by an efficiency index, that is:
E
t
= Ψ
t
Kg
t−1
. (12)
where Ψ
t
is the index of infrastructure efficiency, Kg
t−1
is per capita aggregate stock of
nominal infrastructure which is available for production in period t (according to law of
motion (9))9. Note that nominal infrastructure (Kg
t−1
) is observable but the efficiency
index (Ψ
t
) is not observable and, hence, neither the efficient infrastructure (E
t
).
Hulten (1996) or Aschauer (2000) do not identify a theoretical motive for the differ-
ences in countries’ efficiency index, that is, they treat such index as exogenous to the
governments choice. On the contrary, we assume that the efficiency index depends on
productive public consumption, i.e., the part of public expenditures employed in the use
and maintenance of the physical infrastructures. More precisely, we assume that the ser-
vices offered by the infrastructures to the private inputs are the result of a productive
process in which investment and productive consumption take part together. For exam-
ple, school buildings (investment) and teachers’ wages (consumption) are both necessary
for educational services.
However, it seems more adequate to assume that the efficiency effect of productive
consumption depends on the relative size of consumption with respect to the investment
flow (Cg
t
/Ig
t
). Equivalently, the ratio of consumption to exhaustive expenditure (Cg
t
/G
t
)
results appropiate.
Nevertheless, the ratio Cg
t
/G
t
, previously denoted by Φ
t
, is more convenient because
it falls between 0 and 1, whilst the ratio Cg
t
/Ig
t
is not bounded. See figure 2, where
similarity between the time paths for both ratios is displayed.
[INSERT FIGURE 2]
So, the efficiency function proposed is:
Ψ
t
= Ψ(Cg
t
/G
t
) = Ψ(Φ
t
) . (13)
8
This assumption is standard in the literature, and it captures the fact that labor’s share of output
in many observed economies has remained relatively constant over time.
9
SpecifyingKg
t−1
as a per capita quantity can be viewed as the incorporation of an implicit congestion
effect associated with the number of firms, which is one single representative firm here (See Barro and
Sala-i-Mart
´
in (1992)).
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An efficiency index between 0 and 1 (where 1 denotes maximum efficiency), has the
advantage that public capital is not overvalued with respect to private capital (whose
effective value always coincides with the nominal value). The functional form proposed
is:
Ψ
t
= Ψ(Φ
t
) =
(
e(Φt) − 1
e− 1
)
λ
, (14)
where λ ≥ 0 is a parameter that makes possible modelling two types of public consump-
tion:
• If λ = 0: Ψ
t
= 1. This would be the standard case in which effective infrastructures
coincide with nominal infrastructures; this would be the usual model with non
productive public consumption. In this case, a reallocation of public spending in
favor of consumption just crowds out public investment, leading to welfare losses.
• If λ > 0: Ψ
t
→ 0 when Φ
t
→ 0 and Ψ
t
→ 1 when Φ
t
→ 1. In this case, a reallocation
of public spending towards consumption (∆Φ
t
> 0) induces two opposite effects
on aggregate production: i) a negative effect created by the decline in nominal
infrastructures accumulation, the ’crowding-out effect’ of productive consumption
(see equation 8); and simultaneously, ii) a positive effect created by the more efficient
use of the available nominal infrastructure stock, the ’efficiency effect’ of productive
consumption (see equation 12). Therefore, under this assumption, the net effect
of the reallocation of public spending on aggregate production is undetermined in
advance.
2.3.1 Interpreting the effective infrastructures function
Taking (12) and (14) together, infrastructures in efficiency units are:
E
t
= E(Φ
t
+
,Kg
t−1
+
) =
(
e(Φt) − 1
e− 1
)
λ
Kg
t−1
, (15)
that can be interpreted as the production technology for a public good, in which both
public consumption and public investment are necessary. This formulation implies that
productive public consumption may act as a partial substitute for public capital: a real-
location of public spending in favor of productive consumption rises the efficiency index,
but it also lowers the stock of infrastructures; however, it does not necessarily reduce the
efficient infrastructure stock, and could even increase it.
From (11) and (15), the aggregate production function is:
Y
t
= N 1−α
t
Kα
t−1
(Ψ(Φ
t
) Kg
t−1
)αg , (16)
that verifies the standard conditions of cuasi-concavity, positive and decreasing inputs
marginal productivity under α, αg ∈ (0, 1).
Note that
MP
Kg
=
∂Y
∂Kg
= f(Φ
t
+
) ⇒
∂MP
Kg
∂Φ
t
> 0,
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capturing the efficiency effect of productive public consumption.
This production function (16) can be interpreted as the reduced form of a two-stage
productive process. In the first stage, a public good E
t
is obtained by using technol-
ogy (15). In the second stage, the resulting outcome is incorporated into the aggregate
production technology (11).
The Ψ
t
function can be seen as a transformation of Aschauer’s efficiency index10.
However, using Aschauer’s function would imply that Ψ
t
≥ 1 whenever Φ
t
≥ 0, an
undesirable property in our framework, and our normalization avoids this inconvenience.
On the other hand, our model resembles the one in Devarajan et al (1996), because
both include public consumption and public investment in the aggregate production func-
tion11. However, our model differs from Devarajan et al in two fundamental respects: i)
we formulate an efficiency index, where the role of productive public consumption is in-
corporated; and ii) Devarajan’s optimal composition of public expenditure depends on
the output elasticity of public capital, whose value is rather uncertain because a wide
range of empirical estimates exists; on the contrary, the optimal composition of public
expenditure here is not related to such elasticity, as will be shown later.
Note that public consumption has not been included in the consumer’s utility function
(as opposed to Barro (1990), Lee (1992), Lau (1995), Turnovsky (1996), Ambler and
Paquet (1996), Lansing (1998) or Judd (1999), among others). Althought the welfare
effects of several public consumption components is clear (education, health), the purpose
of using this formulation is to isolate the welfare effects of a reallocation of public spending
towards productive consumption, as a consequence of the productive channel proposed in
the paper.
3 Calibration
Parameters are calibrated to replicate some empirical characteristics of the US economy.
Data are annual for the period 1952-2001. They have been obtained from the National
Income and Product Accounts and the ’Fixed reproducible tangible wealth’ data from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (US Department of Commerce).
To calibrate the composition of public expenditure included in the infrastructures
efficiency index, we have collected those components of the NIPA’s public consumption
10
Aschauer (2000) formulates the infrastructures efficiency index as:
θ =
E
Kg
= e
(  Eff)
where Eff is an standarized version of the efficiency index in Hulten (1996), built from a set of physical
indicators of efficiency, and  is estimated parameter for the countries in the sample. Parameter  is
equivalent to the λ parameter in our model, and the empirical Aschauer’s indicator Eff reminds the
composition ratio Φ.
11
In their Cobb-Douglas version, aggregate output in Devarajan et al (1996) is given by:
y = k
α
g
β
1
g
γ
2
where k is the private capital stock, g
1
is public investment and g
2
is current consumption.
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and investment that previous literature has related to the aggregate production process
through a variety of channels12:
i) By enhancing human capital accumulation, like Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) or
Barro (1989, 1991), or by increasing labor supply efficiency, like Glomm and Ravikumar
(1997). The NIPA’s consumption and investment components that could be assimilated
to these functions are those allocated to ’health’ and ’education’ functions;
ii) By acting as productive factors complementary to private factors. This would be
the case for productive infrastructures in strict sense, according to definitions in Aschauer
(1989) or Easterly and Rebelo (1993). The NIPA’s consumption and investment compo-
nents that could be included in this function are those allocated to the ’economic affairs’
function13;
iii) By protecting property rights, according to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) or
Hall and Jones (1996, 1998). The NIPA’s consumption and investment components that
correspond to this function are those allocated to ’general public service’ and ’public order
and safety’ functions.
Therefore, calibrated productive public consumption is the amount of NIPA’s public
consumption allocated to ’education’, ’health’, ’economic affairs’, ’general public service’
and ’public order and safety’. Calibrated investment is the amount of NIPA’s public in-
vestment allocated to the enumerated functions. The addition of productive consumption
plus investment yields the amount of public expenditures. The composition of public
expenditure is characterized by the percentage of productive consumption over public
expenditures.
Some empirical research has offered evidence supporting the assumption of a positive
effect on growth from the three types of public consumption enumerated above. First,
Devarajan et al (1996) find that total public spending allocated to education, health and
transport is productive for those countries with a large ratio of current public consump-
tion over total spending. They explain this result as an evidence that these economic
functions are productive for those governments that use public capital in an efficient
manner. Kneller et al (1999) find productive effects for the total public spending on
education, health, transport and communications and general services (administration,
justice, defense, etc.), once the negative effects of their financing through taxes is taken
into account. Pe´rez (2001), by using bivariate Autorregresive Vectors with annual amer-
ican data (1952-1996), finds a positive relationship between the rate of GDP-growth and
the rate of growth for the three types of public consumption detailed in points i)-iii).
Private and public capital stocks have been obtained from the ’Fixed reproducible
tangible wealth’ data from the BEA (yearend estimates in ’chained (1996) dollars’).
Private capital includes non residential fixed assets, in per capita terms. On the other
hand, nominal public capital (or infrastructures) includes government owned equipment
and nonresidential structures, excluding military components, in per capita terms. This
12
See Steven Lin (1994, page 83) for a similar list of the economic functions by which government
activity could act on the aggregate production through its interaction with the private sector. Current
public consumption in Devarajan et al (1996, page 323) also includes a similar group of economic functions
to the ones enumerated here.
13
Which includes: General economic and labor affairs, Agriculture, Energy, Natural resources, Trans-
portation, Postal service.
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same definition is used, for example, by Cassou and Lansing (1998). Private and public
capital are net of depreciation.
Depreciation rates for private and public capital are calibrated from the law of motion
for each capital stock. The resulting depreciation rates for private capital (δ
k
) and public
capital (δ
g
) are, respectively, 0.1 and 0.04. The output elasticity for private capital (α) is
calibrated as the percentage of GNP that remunerates private capital (following Cooley
and Prescott (1995)14), obtaining a level of 0.34, which is standard in the literature. By
emboding the calibrated levels of α and the private capital to output ratio (K/Y = 2.1)
into the household’s intertemporal first order condition (in the stationary steady state),
the discount parameter is obtained (β=0.98).
There exists a wide range of empirical estimates for the output elasticity of public
capital (α
g
). Estimates go from near zero (Ratner (1983), Aaron (1990) or Tatom (1991))
to near 0.4 (Aschauer (1989), Holtz-Eakin (1988), Munell (1990)), with some intermediate
levels (Finn (1993) estimates a value of 0.16). Hence, we have repeated the normative
analysis for different values of α
g
: 0.32, 0.16 y 0.08, covering more or less the whole range.
It will be shown that the public spending optimal composition results are not affected by
the elasticity parameter, supporting the robustness of the normative conclusions.
Because the sum of elasticities for the cumulative factors is lower than unity (α +
α
g
< 1), whatever the calibration for α
g
, the model does not exhibit endogenous growth.
Anyway, this is not a limitation here because the analysis is centered in the study of
ratios: Cg/G, Kg/K and E/K.
The tax rate is calibrated as the ratio of total public tax revenues (personal taxes,
indirect business taxes, taxes on business profits and contributions to social insurance)
to GNP for the US economy. This definition seems appropiate to capture the only tax
defined in the model, which affects agent’s total rents, those obtained from labor and
capital renting. The resulting tax rate (τ ) is 0.28.
The public spending composition (Cg
t
/G
t
ratio) path, displays two clearly differenced
sample levels (see figure 3).
[INSERT FIGURE 3]
The mean value for the first sample, from 1952 to 1968, is 0.74, while for the second
sample, from 1975 to 2001, is 0.83. Parameter λ will be calibrated in order to be consistent
with the observed values for the composition ratio, assuming an optimizing government
behaviour.
The ratio of public spending to GDP (γ) is calibrated so that the nominal infras-
tructures to private capital ratio (Kg/K) replicates the mean level observed for the US
economy in the period 1952 to 1968 (Kg/K=0.69), before the public spending reallocation
took place. The resulting value for γ is 0.216.
Finally, the persistence parameter for the public spending composition ratio is also
calibrated. It will be used to characterize the transition dynamics of the model, as well as
to obtain the dynamic golden rule for the composition of public spending. The persistence
parameter (ρΦ) is computed from the first order autorregresive parameter for the ciclical
14
The computation of α is included in a technical appendix that is available from the author upon
request.
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component for the US composition ratio, obtained from the original series by using the
Hodrick-Prescott filter. The calibrated value for this persistence parameter is 0.6 (with
annual data).
We have performed a sensitivity analysis for α
g
, ρΦ, σ, α, τ , γ.
4 Static golden rule
4.1 Competitive Equilibrium
Let Π = {γ, τ , {Φ
t
}∞
t=0
} be an exogenously given public policy. A competitive equilibrium,
given Π, is defined as the set of allocations {C
t
, N
t
, K
t
}∞
t=0
, together with the set of prices
{w
t
, r
t
}∞
t=0
guaranteing:
i) {C
t
, N
t
, K
t
}∞
t=0
solve the household’s optimization problem, given {τ , {w
t
, r
t
, TR
t
}∞
t=0
} .
ii) {N
t
,K
t−1
}∞
t=0
solve the firm’s optimization problem, given {w
t
, r
t
}∞
t=0
.
iii) The government budget constraint and, iv) the aggregate resources aggregate con-
straint, are both satisfied each period:
TR
t
= T
t
−G
t
,
Y
t
= C
t
+ I
t
+G
t
.
where all the variables are in aggregate per capita terms.
From the firm’s and household’s first order conditions, together with the aggregate
resources constraint and the goverment budget constraint the economy stationary steady
state is obtained, whose output level is (see technical appendix at the end):
Y = χ [Ψ(Φ) (1− Φ)]
α
g
1−α−α
g , (17)
where χ =
[
α(1−τ)
1
β
−(1−δ
k
)
] α
1−α−α
g
[
γ
δ
g
] αg
1−α−α
g
, and the variables without the t index denote
steady state levels.
4.2 Static Golden Rule
Definition 1 The static public spending composition Golden Rule is the level of the com-
position ratio that maximizes the steady state level of private consumption.
Proposition 1 The static public spending composition Golden Rule depends only on the
λ parameter, in a monotonically increasing manner.
Proof. The static golden rule is obtained as the solution to the problem:
Max
{Φ}
C = ηY = ηχ [Ψ(Φ) (1−Φ)]
α
g
1−α−α
g ,
where η = 1− γ − αβδk(1−τ)
1−β(1−δ
k
)
.
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The first order condition for that problem is:
∂Y
t
∂Φ
t
= 0 : Ω [Ψ(Φ) (1− Φ)]
α
g
1−α−α
g
−1
[
(1− Φ)Ψ
′
(Φ)−Ψ(Φ)
]
= 0 ,
where Ω = ηχ αg
1−α−α
g
and Ψ
′
(Φ) = ∂Ψ(Φ)
∂Φ
.
Apart from the trivial solution (Φ = 1, that would yield a zero value for all the
endogenous variables in the stationary steady state), the optimal composition (Φ∗) is
obtained: [
(1− Φ∗)Ψ
′
(Φ∗)−Ψ(Φ∗)
]
= 0 ,
or equivalently,
Ψ(Φ∗) [λ(1−Φ∗)
eΦ
∗
eΦ∗ − 1
− 1] = 0 . (18)
From which we get an implicit function for the composition ratio:
λ = Θ(Φ
+
∗) , (19)
where Θ(Φ∗) =
(
1− 1
e
Φ
∗
) (
1
1−Φ
∗
)
.
The second order condition for a maximun is15{
(1−Φ∗)Ψ
′′
(Φ∗)− 2 Ψ
′
(Φ∗)
}
< 0→
{
Φ∗ + eΦ
∗
[λ(1− Φ∗)− 2]
}
< −1 , (20)
where Ψ
′′
(Φ∗) = ∂
2
Ψ(Φ)
∂Φ
2
. This condition is always verified for the zeros of equation (19).
The positive relationship between the optimal composition ratio (Φ∗) and λ parameter
is displayed in the following figure:
[INSERT FIGURE 4]
Characterization of the optimal solution is readily obtained from the analysis of the
bracketed terms in (18). The first term represents the efficiency effect that a reallocation of
public spending towards productive consumption induces on the nominal infrastructures
(because they are used in a more efficient way), which depends positively on λ. The
second term represents the crowding-out effect that such reallocation induces on nominal
infrastructures (because fewer resources are allocated to the accumulation of physical
infrastructures), and it is equal to one. The balance between the efficiency and the
crowding-out effects determines the optimal composition of public spending. The larger
λ, the larger the relative weight of the efficiency effect with respect to the crowding-
out effect, and hence, the larger the optimal percentage of public spending allocated to
productive consumption.
15
∂
2
Y
∂Φ
2
= Ω(
α
g
1−α−α
g
− 1) [Ψ(Φ) (1−Φ)]
α
g
1−α−α
g
−2
[
(1−Φ)Ψ
′
(Φ)−Ψ(Φ)
]
2
+ ...
Ω [Ψ(Φ) (1−Φ)]
α
g
1−α−α
g
−1
[
(1−Φ)Ψ
′′
(Φ)− 2 Ψ
′
(Φ)
]
< 0
Because the first term is zero in the optimum, the second order condition is given by equation (20).
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In particular, for the case λ = 0, that is, for the standard model of non-productive
public consumption, the normative results obtained here resembles the one from the pre-
vious literature: because the only effect on infrastructures of a reallocation of government
spending towards consumption is the crowding-out effect, the optimal ruling is to allocate
the whole spending to investment (many authors have found that the growth-maximizing
ratio of public non-productive consumption to output is zero, for example Barro, 1990,
or Judd, 1999).
Now it is possible to calibrate the λ parameter from the observed composition ratio
in the US economy, by assuming that such composition is the result from an optimizing
government behaviour within a competitive private sector framework. First, taking as
optimal the mean composition for 1952 to 1968 (0.74), λ level is aproximately 2.0, but
taking as optimal the mean composition for 1975 to 2001 (0.83), λ level changes to 3.3.
Therefore, the analysis of real data must be done for an interval of λ between 2 and 3.3.
The planner solution is also computed and it is included in the technical appendix
at the end of the paper. The main conclusion is that, like the competitive solution, the
planner rule is also increasing in the λ parameter and, furthermore, it does not depend
on the output elasticity of public capital (α
g
).
Because the value of α
g
is subject to great uncertainty, this property looks advanta-
geous with respect to Devarajan et al (1996): the optimal composition in their model
depends positively on the output elasticity of public consumption and negatively on the
output elasticity of public investment16.
5 Transitional dynamics
The question now is, which are the effects on the endogenous variables of a change in the
composition of productive public spending in favor of consumption?. This has been the
observed process for the US economy since 1968 (see Figure 3 again).
The observed process in the composition of public spending is simplified in the follow-
ing way. We assume that the composition ratio follows an autorregresive process, whose
mean value represents the objective level established by government. The experiment
consists of assuming that the objective level changed after 1968.
The assumed process for the composition ratio is given by:
lnΦ
t
= (1− ρΦ) ln Φ¯ + ρΦ ln Φ
t−1
,
where ρΦ is the persistence parameter and Φ¯ is the objective level for the composition
established by government.
We assume that the objective level until 1968 was 0.74 (Φ¯0) rising thereafter to 0.83
(Φ¯1). Note that this experiment does not increase the financing needs of the public sector,
16
The optimal composition in these authors’ model, in its Cobb-Douglas version of footnote 9, is given
by the relative level of the output elasticity of public investment (g
1
) and public consumption (g
2
):
g
2
g
1
+ g
2
=
γ
β + γ
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which are given by the percentage of total spending over output (γ), that has not changed.
Consequently, changing the tax rate on income (τ ) is not necessary. The modelled path
for the composition ratio is displayed in figure 5a.
[INSERT FIGURE 5a]
This reallocation of public spending induces the transition towards a new steady state
for the endogenous variables.17
In particular, we are interested on the transition path for the nominal and effective
infrastructures, and also on the induced effect on output and consumption of the change
in the target for the composition of public expenditures.
The experiment requires a level for the λ parameter. From the previous section results,
a value of λ = 3.3 is chosen, because we assume that the observed path for the composition
ratio is the result of an optimizing behaviour of the government. We also assume an output
elasticity for public capital of 0.16.
The effects of the public spending reallocation appear in figures 5b and 5c.
[INSERT FIGURES 5b 5c]
The public spending reallocation induces:
i) A lower accumulation of nominal infrastructures because of the crowding-out effect
of productive consumption.
ii) A rise of the infrastructures efficiency index that counterbalances the nominal
infrastructures decline. This is the efficiency effect of productive consumption.
iii) As a consequence, the effective infrastructures to private capital ratio rises after
the public spending reallocation and, at the end of the sample, is even larger than at the
begining. Under the proposed theoretical framework the lower accumulation of nominal
infrastructures has been compensated by a better use of them after the policy change.
iv) The observed reallocation of public spending leads to an increase of output and
consumption that achieves a welfare gain of 3.9 percentage points of output. This gain
represents the percentage in which initial private consumption should be increased every
year so that the discounted lifetime utility would coincide with the one achieved as a
result of the policy reform. The computation of welfare gain is carried out as usual18.
17
The transition path for the control variable and the remains of endogenous variables are obtained
by Sims’ (1990) procedure to compute a numerical solution to a dynamic general equilibrium model.
Stability conditions (characterizing the convergence subspace towards steady state, and guaranteing that
transversality conditions are fulfilled) are given by the left eigenvectors corresponding to the unstable
eigenvalues of the transition matrix in the linear approximation to the model economy.
18
Computation of welfare gain includes the following steps: i) computing the dis-
counted lifetime utility corresponding to the public spending reallocation:
̂
U =
∞
∑
t=0
β
t
U
(
C
t
(Φ
t∈(1952,1968)
= 0.74; Φ
t∈(1969,∞)
= 0.83
)
; ii) computing the constant level of pri-
vate consumption that would achieve the level of discounted utility obtained in (i):
̂
C =
[(1 − β) (1 − σ)
̂
U + 1]
1/(1−σ)
; iii) computing the percent increment in inicial steady state pri-
vate consumption (C
SS,0
(Φ
t∈(1952,∞)
= 0.74)) necessary to match
̂
C, and expressing it as a percentage
of initial steady state output (Y
SS,0
(Φ
t∈(1952,∞)
= 0.74)) , that is:
b
C−C
SS,0
Y
SS,0
· 100.
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Next we repeat the experiment assuming that the composition ratio at the begining
of the sample is the optimal one, which leads to a calibrated λ of 2.0. The effects of
the government spending reallocation are qualitatively similar, although the welfare gain
is lower: around 1 percentage point of aggregate output. As a conclusion, even if the
optimal composition was the one prevailing at the begining of the sample, the short-run
effects of the public spending reallocation induce a significant welfare gain, through the
rise in effective infrastructures.
6 Dynamic golden rule
It has been shown that the transition effects of a public spending composition reform are
not negligible. Hence, it seems sensible to assume that a government should be interested
in implementing the reform that maximizes the discounted utility of households along the
transition. Consequently, a new Golden Rule definition is proposed now.
Definition 2 Dynamic Golden Rule is defined as the public spending composition that
maximizes the agent’s discounted utility along the transition from the initial situation to
the steady state corresponding to the new composition ratio.
Computation of the dynamic golden rule has been made by partially following Cooley
and Hansen (1992):
i) Given a level for the λ parameter, and starting at the initial composition ratio
(Φ¯0 = 0.74) the government changes the objective level for that ratio to Φ¯1.
ii) The transition from the initial composition towards the final one is performed
according to the calibrated persistence parameter for the US.
iii) The transition path for the state and control variables is computed from the com-
petitive equilibrium conditions.
iv) The achieved welfare gain from the reform is then computed.
This experiment is repeated for every possible new objective level of the composition
ratio; that is, it is repeated for a grid of Φ¯1 ∈ (0, 1). The optimal level of the composition
ratio is the one that leads to the largest welfare gain as a result of the reform, given the
level of λ.
In the experiment, there is an implicit assumption that the government will actually
implement the composition path
{
Φ¯0,
{
Φ¯1
}
∞
t=1
}
, once the optimal final ratio has been
chosen.
The results for a wide range of λ parameter values are displayed in the figure below,
together with the static golden rule. The experiment has assumed the output elasticity
parameter for infrastructures (α
g
) to be 0.16.
[INSERT FIGURE 6]
The main implications from the figure are:
i) The dynamic golden rule level of the composition ratio is larger than the static one,
for any positive level of the λ parameter. The reason is that the dynamic rule achieves
better short-run results on welfare, lower losses or larger gains, althought the long-run
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results on welfare are worse than for the static rules, lower gains or larger losses. There
exist short run losses whenever the initial ratio is larger than the final one, and there exist
long-run gains whenever the final ratio is nearer to the static golden rule than the initial
ratio.
ii) Similarities between the static and dynamic rules allow us to interpret the dynamic
rule as the intertemporal balance between the efficiency and the crowding-out effects of
productive consumption on the nominal infrastructures. Because the positive efficiency
effect of productive consumption is concentrated in the short-run and the dynamic rule
confers a larger weight to short-run effects, a larger ratio of consumption to total spending
is chosen when transitional dynamics are taken into account.
Considering the dynamic rule, which should be the calibrated λ for the US economy?.
If we take as optimal the composition ratio at the end of the sample, λ would be aproxi-
mately 2.05. Ignoring the transitional dynamics of the economy would (wrongly) suggest
a much lower composition ratio, of around 0.74.
The dynamic golden rule has been obtained for different values of the most significant
parameters (α
g
, Φ¯0, ρΦ, σ, γ, τ ) and a summary of these results are available in table 1.
[INSERT TABLE 1]
The main conclusion of the sensitivity analysis is that the dynamic golden rule is
hardly altered by changes in any of these parameters. In particular, the output elasticity
of public capital (α
g
parameter) is irrelevant when characterizing the optimal composition
ratio corresponding to a given λ. This result is similar to the one obtained for the static
golden rule. As it was said before, this is a crucial advantage of the model because of the
large uncertainty about the real level of this parameter (α
g
). Furthermore, the initial level
for the composition ratio (Φ¯0) and the persistence parameter (ρΦ) also have a negligible
relevance, supporting the robustness of the results.
6.1 A look at US data
Next, we compare the observed series paths for US data and the model. We assume
the same public spending reallocation used in the transitional dynamics section: that is,
until 1968 the objective level of the composition ratio is 0.74 (Φ¯0) increasing to 0.83 (Φ¯1)
thereafter. Experiments are carried out for the two λ values calibrated for the last part of
the data sample under the static and the dynamic golden rule definitions (2.05 and 3.3).
Three levels for α
g
have also been considered. The analysis is focused on characterizing the
transition path for both the ratio of nominal infrastructures (Kg) over private capital (K)
and the ratio of effective infrastructures (E) over private capital, assuming the efficiency
index proposed in the paper. See figures 7a, 7b, 7c, 7d
For λ = 3.3 and α
g
= 0.32, the Kg/K ratio (figure 7a) observed in the US economy
has been at the level or slightly above the model ratio for most of the period after 1968,
with the exception of the last years (1998 and after). On the other hand, assuming α
g
=
0.16, there are some periods of time in which the Kg/K ratio has been a little lower than
the model ratio (periods 1978-1991 and 1996 onwards); however, there is not evidence
in any of the two cases that the available public capital is too low in relative terms to
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private capital. Only when the assumed α
g
is 0.08, the observed path for the ratio is
systematically below the model ratio, although the distance is not very large.
The model Kg/K path changes with α
g
because this parameter alters the convergence
speed of the ratio: even though the final steady state is the same in the three cases (see
equation 21 in the technical appendix), the speed of convergence to such ratio is larger
for higher α
g
.
The conclusions for the analysis of the E/K ratios (figure 7b) for different α
g
are
similar to the ones for Kg/K; all of the model ratios suggest that the observed ratio is
too low for the last part of the sample (after the mid-nineties). The reason is that in the
last years the decline of the Kg/K ratio adds to the decline of the efficiency index (as a
consequence of a lower composition ratio, see figures 1 and 3 again).
The experiment is repeated for λ = 2.05 and the three levels of α
g
already mentioned
(figures 7c and 7d), leading to cualitatively similar conclusions.
Although in this second case the model Kg/K and E/K ratios differ more markedly
from the observed ratio, the observed ratio is not significantly below the model ratio,
except for the last years.
On the other hand, under this theoretical framework, welfare gains achieved by the
public spending reallocation are far from being negligible. Under λ = 3.3, welfare gains
obtained from the government spending reallocation range from 1.9 percentage points of
GDP, under α
g
= 0.08, to 10.5 percentage points of GDP, under α
g
=0.32. For λ = 2.05,
welfare gains are placed between 0.5 and 2.5 percentage points respectively.
The major conclusion of the experiment is that, whatever the chosen λ value, the
similarity between the model ratios and the observed ratios (Kg/K and E/K) is large.
Therefore, under this interpretation, there is not evidence that available public capital has
been significantly low relative to private capital, with the exception of the last years. This
suggests that the observed paths in the US could also be viewed as the convergence towards
an optimal composition of productive public spending. A lower stock of infrastructures
has been accumulated, but it has been used more efficiently. Only for the last years of
the sample (1996 and onwards) a growing divergence of the observed from the optimal
ratio is found.
7 Conclusions
This paper links the works of Hulten (1996) and Aschauer (2000), on the one hand, and
Devarajan et al. (1996) on the other, by analyzing: i) the role played in the aggregate
production process by the efficiency with which infrastructures are used; ii) the role played
in the efficient use of infrastructures by the public consumption expenditure allocated to
the operation and maintenance of the infrastructure stock.
The aim of this paper is to obtain the optimal allocation of public spending between
investment, i.e., expenditures that accumulate physical infrastructures, and productive
consumption, i.e., expenditures for operation and maintenance of infrastructures.
The main contributions of the paper are:
i) Extending the neoclassical growth model with productive public capital by including
an infrastructure efficiency index, which is assumed to depend on a public choice variable,
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in particular, the share of public spending allocated to productive public consumption.
ii) Specifying a golden rule for the allocation of public expenditure between produc-
tive consumption and investment. Two definitions of golden rule are proposed: the first
is obtained by maximizing the steady state welfare, and the second is characterized by
maximizing the welfare along the transition from the initial situation to the final steady
state. Both of them can be interpreted as the balance between the efficiency and the
crowding-out effects that a reallocation of public spending towards productive consump-
tion induces on the nominal infrastructures: they are used in a more efficient way, but
also fewer resources are allocated to the accumulation of physical infrastructures. We
also show that a larger ratio of consumption to total spending is chosen when transitional
dynamics are taken into account.
iii) We conclude, under this framework, that the observed paths for the ratio of nominal
infrastructures to private capital and for the efficiency index in the US economy during
the last fifty years have been close to optimal. There is not evidence that nominal public
capital has been significantly low relative to private capital, with the exception of the
last years. This suggests that the observed paths in the US could also be viewed as the
convergence towards an optimal composition of productive public spending. A lower stock
of infrastructures has been accumulated, but it has been used more efficiently. Only for
the last years of the sample (1996 and onwards) a growing divergence of the observed
from the optimal ratio is found.
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Figure 6
λ Benchmark (*) αg=0.08 αg=0.32 Φ0 = 0.5 ρΦ = 0 σ = 3 γ = 0.1 τ = 0.4
1 0.667 0.665 0.670 0.699 0.668 0.672 0.668 0.668
2 0.829 0.830 0.827 0.849 0.828 0.828 0.830 0.830
3 0.890 0.892 0.886 0.902 0.889 0.888 0.891 0.891
Table 1: Sensitivity analysis of the Dynamic Golden Rule for the Composition of
Government Expenditure.
(*) Benchmark:
α
g
= 0.16 τ = 0.28
Φ
0
= 0.74 α = 0.34
ρΦ = 0.6 β = 0.98
σ = 1.5 δ
k
= 0.1
γ = 0.216 δ
g
= 0.04
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10 Appendix
10.1 Competitive equilibrium
The firm’s objective function is:
Max
{N
t
,K
t−1
}
Y
t
− w
t
N
t
− r
t
K
t−1
and the first order conditions are (obtained from the objective function maximization
with respect to the decision variables, taking as given the input prices because the firm
is competitive in the input markets):
w
t
= (1− α)
Y
t
N
t
= w(N
t
, K
t−1
, Kg
t−1
,Φ
t
) ,
r
t
= α
Y
t
K
t−1
= r(N
t
, K
t−1
, Kg
t−1
,Φ
t
) .
The consumer lagrangean function is:
$ =
∞∑
t=0
{
C1−σ
t
− 1
1− σ
− µ
t
βt [K
t
− (w
t
N
t
+ r
t
K
t−1
)(1− τ ) + TR
t
...
−C
t
+ (1− δ
k
)K
t−1
]}
and the first order conditions (by substituing the firm’s first order conditions):
∂$
∂N
t
= 0 : N
t
= 1 ,
∂$
∂C
t
= 0 : µ
t
= C−σ
t
,
∂$
∂K
t
= 0 :
µ
t
µ
t+1
= β
{
1− δ
k
+ (1− τ)
αY
t+1
K
t
}
.
where µ
t
is the budget constraint Lagrange multiplier.
Solution must also verify the aggregate resources and the goverment budget con-
straints:
(1− γ)Y
t
= C
t
+K
t
− (1− δ
k
)K
t−1
,
Kg
t
= (1− δ
g
) Kg
t−1
+ (1−Φ
t
) γ Y
t
,
TR
t
= (τ − γ)Y
t
,
Y
t
= N 1−α
t
Kα
t−1
((
e(Φt) − 1
e− 1
)
λ
Kg
t−1
)
α
g
.
And also the transversality condition:
lim
t→∞
E
0
βt µ
t
K
t
= 0 ,
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which guarantees that the first order conditions for optimality are sufficient.
From this equations system, the economy steady state can be obtained, whose pro-
duction level is:
Y = χ [Ψ(Φ) (1− Φ)]
α
g
1−α−α
g ,
where χ =
[
α(1−τ)
1
β
−(1−δ
k
)
] α
1−α−α
g
[
γ
δ
g
] αg
1−α−α
g
.
The expression for the infrastructures to public capital ratio is given by:
Kg
K
=
[
γ
1− Φ
δ
g
] [
α (1− τ )
1
β
− (1− δ
k
)
]
−1
(21)
10.2 Planner Equilibrium
The planner solution is given by a set of allocations
{C
t
, N
t
, K
t
,Φ
t
, Kg
t
}∞
t=0
, that solves the following optimization problem:
Max
{C
t
,N
t
,K
t
,Φ
t
,Kg
t
}
∞
t=0
E
0
{
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
C1−σ
t
− 1
1− σ
)}
s.t. :
(1− γ)Y
t
= C
t
+K
t
− (1− δ
k
)K
t−1
,
Kg
t
= (1− δ
g
) Kg
t−1
+ (1− Φ
t
) γ Y
t
,
Y
t
= N1−α
t
Kα
t−1
((
e(Φt) − 1
e− 1
)
λ
Kg
t−1
)
α
g
.
By combining equations, the lagrangean is:
$ =
∞∑
t=0
{
C1−σ
t
− 1
1− σ
− µ
t
βt
[
N 1−α
t
Kα
t−1
(Ψ(Φ
t
) Kg
t−1
)αg − C
t
...
−K
t
+ (1− δ
k
)K
t−1
−
1
1−Φ
t
[Kg
t
− (1− δ
g
) Kg
t−1
]
]}
and the first order conditions are:
∂$
∂N
t
= 0 : N
t
= 1 ,
∂$
∂C
t
= 0 : µ
t
= C−σ
t
,
∂$
∂K
t
= 0 :
µ
t
µ
t+1
= β
{
1− δ
k
+
αY
t+1
K
t
}
,
∂$
∂Kg
t
= 0 :
µ
t
µ
t+1
= β(1−Φ
t
)
{
1− δ
g
1−Φ
t+1
+
α
g
Y
t+1
Kg
t
}
,
∂$
∂Φ
t
= 0 : α
g
Y
t
Ψ
′
(Φ
t
)
Ψ(Φ
t
)
=
1
(1− Φ
t
)2
[Kg
t
− (1− δ
g
) Kg
t−1
] .
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Proposition 2 The static planner Golden Rule is larger than the competitive equilibrium
Golden Rule.
Proof. By combining the first order conditions of the optimization problem and solving
the stationary steady state, a new implicit function of the optimal composition ratio is
obtained:
λ = ∆(ΦP ) = ϕ Θ(ΦP ) , (22)
where P -index denotes the planner solution, ϕ = δg
1
β
−1+δ
g
< 1 and Θ(Φ) =
(
1− 1
e
Φ
) (
1
1−Φ
)
(see (19)).
Consequently, the optimal planner composition is larger than the competitive optimal
composition for a given λ. That is, the planner would allocate a larger percentage of
public exhaustive spending to productive consumption:
ΦP > Φ∗ , ∀λ.
29
